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Ancient Laws, Yet Strangely Modern: 
Biblical Contract and Tort Jurisprudence∗ 
RICHARD H. HIERS∗∗ 
Abstract: 
People generally, and even most biblical scholars, tend to view 
biblical law as, at best, a random patchwork of odd and antiquated 
commandments and rules.  The present Article demonstrates that many 
biblical laws can be understood to have functioned in biblical time, in ways 
remarkably similar to various laws characterized in modern Anglo-
American jurisprudence as contract and tort law.  In particular, the Article 
points out that the biblical tort laws found in Exodus 21:18 through 22:17 
are structured along lines closely parallel to concepts found in modern tort 
law jurisprudence.  Many of the biblical laws considered here give 
expression to the underlying values of concern for the worth and well being 
of both individuals and the community.  The findings here should be of 
interest to both legal and biblical scholars. 
 
Once when Jacob was cooking a stew, Esau came in from the 
field, and he was famished.  Esau said to Jacob, “Let me eat some 
of that red stuff, for I am famished!”. . . Jacob said, “First sell me 
your birthright.”  Esau said, “I am about to die; of what use is a 
birthright to me?”  Jacob said, “Swear to me first.”  So he swore 
to him, and sold his birthright to Jacob.1 
 
 
 ∗ This Article is based on a chapter by the same author in a book entitled JUSTICE 
AND COMPASSION IN BIBLICAL LAW (2009).  Republication here is with permission of the 
publisher, Continuum International.  The present Article includes substantial additions and 
other revisions. 
 ∗∗ Professor of Religion, Emeritus, and Affiliate Professor of Law, Emeritus, the 
University of Florida; former President of the American Academy of Religion, Southeast 
Region, and of the Society of Biblical Literature, Southeast Region; former law clerk for 
Judge Jerre S. Williams, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Judicial Circuit; and member of 
the Florida Bar and the Bar Association of the Fifth Federal Circuit. 
 1. Genesis 25:29–25:33.  Quotations from the Bible, unless otherwise noted, are from 
THE NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE WITH THE APOCRYPHAL/DEUTEROCANONICAL BOOKS: 
NEW REVISED STANDARD VERSION (Michael D. Coogan ed., 3d ed. 2001) (1989).  
Occasionally quotations are from THE NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE WITH THE 
APOCRYPHA: REVISED STANDARD VERSION (Herbert G. May & Bruce M. Metzger eds., 2d 
ed. 1977) (1965) [hereinafter NOAB-RSV].  Citations from the Revised Standard Version 
are identified by the abbreviation, RSV.   
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When a man causes a field or vineyard to be grazed over, or lets 
his beast loose and it feeds in another man’s field, he shall make 
restitution from the best in his own field and in his own 
vineyard.2 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern Western jurisprudence distinguishes between criminal and 
civil law.  The former category relates to actions or activities that are 
deemed harmful to the community or (as in states like California) to “the 
people” generally.  Criminal offenses are usually punishable by fine, 
imprisonment, or—if a capital offense—by execution under the authority 
of public officials.3  Major civil law categories include contracts and torts.  
Other categories of law, such as those regarding transfer of property and 
social legislation may also be classed as civil law.  This Article examines 
biblical laws and narratives that represent, what in modern jurisprudence 
would be classified as contract laws, and then turns to biblical laws 
governing what now would be designated as torts. 
Contract law concerns arrangements between persons or “parties” who 
seek to gain something from each other through an exchange of goods, 
services, money, or other valuables, typically referred to in modern contract 
jurisprudence as “consideration.”4  A basic feature of modern contract law 
is “offer and acceptance.”  For a contract to be binding there must be a 
“meeting of the minds”; that is, the parties must agree to the terms of the 
contract.  Such agreement may be either written or oral.  When one party to 
such an agreement fails to perform the agreed to terms, the other party 
typically seeks monetary damages or some other remedy.   
Tort offenses, on the other hand, are those offenses that harm 
individual persons or their property, whether intentionally, recklessly, or as 
the result of simple negligence.5  Such harm may then be remedied by 
restitution or payment of damages to the persons injured or to those whose 
property has been damaged.  If the tortfeasor—the person who did the 
wrong—acted recklessly or intentionally, a court typically will award 
punitive or multiple damages in addition to remedial damages or 
restitution. 
 
 2. Exodus 22:5 (RSV). 
 3. See RICHARD H. HIERS, JUSTICE AND COMPASSION IN BIBLICAL LAW 61–164 (2009) 
(discussing biblical criminal law). 
 4. See generally AMY HILSMAN KASTELY, DEBORAH WAIRE POST & SHARON KANG 
HOM, CONTRACTING LAW (2d ed. 2000); ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS  
(1952) [hereinafter CORBIN 1952]; ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
(Joseph M. Perillo ed., 1993) [hereinafter CORBIN 1993]. 
 5. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (W. Page Keeton ed., 
5th ed. 1984) (1941). 
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I. BIBLICAL CONTRACT LAWS 
Provisions for contracts are found in both biblical laws and in a 
number of stories or narratives where the persons or parties involved 
negotiate and enter into contractual agreements.  Laws explicitly relating to 
contracts will be considered first. 
A. Specific Laws 
Only a few biblical laws relate directly to contracts.  All of these laws 
were evidently intended to protect the interests of persons who would likely 
be adversely affected by contractual agreements.  In some instances, 
affected persons would include parties to the agreements who were in 
relatively weak bargaining positions.6  In others, the parties affected might 
be third persons whose interests might otherwise be infringed by the 
contracting parties. 
The first eleven verses of Exodus chapter 21 relate to purchase or 
sales contracts.7  Exodus 21:1–22:6 set out “the ordinances” that governed 
when someone bought a Hebrew slave.8  These ordinances specified that 
such slaves were to be freed after six years of service and defined the 
circumstances under which a slave’s wife and children might either be or 
become slaves themselves, or else be freed.9  Chapter 21:7–21:11 sets out 
those conditions or requirements that were to go into effect when a man 
sold his daughter as a slave.10  The purchaser was obliged to treat her well, 
and if he did not do so, she was to go free.11 
Exodus 22:25–22:27 references a law that clearly has to do with 
debtor-creditor relations of an implicitly contractual nature.  This law 
emphasizes God’s compassion as its basis, concluding: 
If ever you take your neighbor’s garment in pledge, you shall 
restore it to him before the sun goes down; for that is his only 
covering, it is his mantle for his body; in what else shall he sleep?  
And if he cries to me, I will hear, for I am compassionate.12 
The version of this law in Deuteronomy 24:10–24:13 adds a further 
restriction on a lender’s conduct: “When you make your neighbor a loan of 
 
 6. See KASTELY ET AL., supra note 4, at 632–33; see CORBIN 1993, supra note 4, at 
13–15 (discussing how modern law also generally disapproves as “unconscionable” and 
may not enforce “adhesion contracts,” that is, contracts drafted by relatively powerful 
parties in circumstances that leave those in relatively weak bargaining positions little choice 
but to “agree” to adverse terms).   
 7. Exodus 21:1–21:11. 
 8. Exodus 21:1–21:6. 
 9. See HIERS, supra note 3, at 204–09. 
 10. Exodus 21:7–21:11. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Exodus 22:26–22:27 (RSV). 
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any sort, you shall not go into his house to fetch his pledge.”13  Nor were 
creditors to take a widow’s clothing in pledge.14  Another law provided that 
creditors were not to take in pledge (or as collateral) equipment that served 
as the basis for a debtor’s livelihood: “No one shall take a mill or an upper 
millstone in pledge, for that would be taking a life in pledge.”15 
Both justice and compassion are implicit in Leviticus 19:1316 and 
Deuteronomy 24:14–24:15,17 which required employers to pay hired 
servants or workers the same day the servants or workers earned their 
pay.18  This requirement is illustrated in Jesus’ Parable of the Laborers in 
the Vineyard.19  In this parable, the owner of the field had his foreman pay 
all laborers their wages on the evening of the same day they worked.20   
Compassion for needy borrowers is clearly expressed in the law that 
barred lenders from exacting interest from “any of my people with you who 
is poor.”21  Another law grounded on compassion barred lending money 
with interest, or making a profit from selling food to a “brother [who] 
becomes poor, and cannot maintain himself.”22 
B. Contract Laws in Narrative Contexts 
Several biblical narratives describe contractual agreements.  In each 
case, there was some “consideration,” that is, something of value that one 
party proposed to exchange for something that the other valued.23  
Sometimes complications arose because one party engaged in deceptive 
practices or fraud.  Also one of the parties may have failed to carry out the 
contractual terms, or the parties may have failed to agree as to specific 
 
 13. Deuteronomy 24:10 (RSV).  Instead, the law continued, “You shall stand outside 
and the man to whom you make the loan shall bring the pledge out to you.”  Deuteronomy 
24:11 (RSV).  The man making the loan was entitled to the borrower/debtor’s pledge, but 
this provision assured that the latter’s personal dignity and home privacy was to be 
respected. 
 14. Deuteronomy 24:17. 
 15. Deuteronomy 24:6. 
 16. Leviticus 19:13. 
 17. Deuteronomy 24:14–24:15. 
 18. See Sirach 34:22 (“To take away a neighbor’s living is to commit murder; to 
deprive an employee of wages is to shed blood.”).  See generally Paul B. Rasor, Biblical 
Roots of Modern Consumer Credit Law, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 157 (1993–94); Louis E. 
Newman, Covenant and Contract: A Framework for the Analysis of Jewish Ethics, 9 J.L. & 
RELIGION 89 (1991). 
 19. Matthew 20:1–20:16. 
 20. Matthew 20:8. 
 21. Exodus 22:25 (RSV). 
 22. Leviticus 25:35–25:37 (RSV). 
 23. See KASTELY ET AL., supra note 4, at 263; CORBIN 1952, supra note 4, at 160–65 
(generally discussing consideration). 
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terms.  Some examples of such situations are considered in the following 
paragraphs.24 
Perhaps the earliest account of a contract negotiation is that found in 
Genesis 23:3–23:16, where Abraham, whose wife Sarah had just died, 
undertook to purchase a burying place from his Hittite neighbors.25  In 
particular, Abraham wished to buy a field and a cave, known as the “Cave 
of Machpelah,” from a man named Ephron.26  The bargaining process 
began when Abraham offered to pay “the full price.”27  Ephron countered 
with the seemingly magnanimous offer simply to give Abraham the field 
and the cave.28  Abraham insisted on paying the full price,29 after which, 
Ephron named the figure: “My lord, listen to me; a piece of land worth four 
hundred shekels of silver—what is that between you and me?  Bury your 
dead.”30  Abraham agreed, paid the rather substantial price, and “the field 
with the cave that was in it and all the trees that were in the field, 
throughout its whole area, passed to Abraham as a possession in the 
presence of the Hittites, in the presence of all who went in at the gate . . . 
.”31 
Jacob figured prominently in three other contract accounts.  The first 
was the story in Genesis 25:29–25:34, where Esau, faint with hunger, asked 
Jacob for some of the stew (“pottage”) he had boiled.32  Not one to miss a 
good business opportunity, Jacob offered to let Esau have some, but only if 
Esau first sold him his birthright.33  Here, the “consideration” on one side is 
 
 24. See 1 Kings 5:1–5:11; 1 Kings 9:10–9:14; 2 Chronicles 2:3–2:16 (describing 
contractual agreements between Solomon and Hiram (or Huram), King of Tyre).  These 
accounts report both the agreements and the “consideration” each party was to give the 
other.  The version in 1 Kings 9:10–9:14, however, indicates that Solomon had given Hiram 
different consideration, namely twenty cities in Galilee, and that Hiram, having gone to look 
at them, found these “cities” less than he had bargained for (“What kind of cities are these 
that you have given me, my brother?”).  It is doubtful that there were as many as twenty 
cities in Galilee at the time.  Perhaps the “cities” turned out to be no more than dilapidated 
villages.  Thus, perhaps, the meaning of “Cabul” in 1 Kings 9:13. 
 25. Genesis 23:3–23:16. 
 26. Genesis 23:8–23:9. 
 27. Genesis 23:9.  See also Raymond Westbrook, Purchase of the Cave of Machpelah, 
6 ISRAEL L. REV. 29, 29–38 (1971) (demonstrating that under ancient Near Eastern common 
law, it was necessary to pay the “full price” in order to acquire an inheritable estate in real 
property). 
 28. Genesis 23:11. 
 29. Genesis 23:13. 
 30. Genesis 23:15. 
 31. Genesis 23:16–23:18.  See also Ruth 4:1–4:12.  Witnesses to a prospective land 
transaction “at the gate” are also mentioned in this story.  The scene described in the Book 
of Ruth also involves bargaining for a contract, complicated, however, by the laws or 
customs of land redemption and levirate marriage.  See HIERS, supra note 3, at 40–43, 201–
02. 
 32. Genesis 25:29–25:34. 
 33. Genesis 25:31.  See also HIERS, supra note 3, at 47–51 (discussing the meaning of 
“birthright”). 
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the stew or porridge and on the other, it is the birthright.  Esau agreed with 
an oral acceptance: “So he swore to him, and sold his birthright to Jacob.”34  
The narrator, whose sympathies were obviously with Jacob,35 was not 
troubled by the fact that Jacob obtained Esau’s agreement under conditions 
that might now be considered to involve duress.36  On two later occasions 
Jacob negotiated employment contracts with his kinsman, Laban.37  Each 
time however, Laban engaged in deceptive or fraudulent practices to his 
own advantage.38  Apparently, in those times there was no provision for 
voiding contracts on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation.39 
Another famous biblical scene also involved an oral contract.  This 
was the story in Numbers about Balak, King of Moab, hiring Balaam, a 
professional prophet or execrator, to go and curse the menacing horde of 
Israelites who were about to encroach on the land of Moab.40  Exact terms 
were not specified, but it was clear that Balak offered to pay Balaam a 
substantial fee or “honorarium” to undertake this task: “Let nothing hinder 
you from coming to me; for I will surely do you great honor, and . . . come 
curse this people for me.”41  After Balaam repeatedly blessed the Israelites 
instead of cursing them, the exasperated Balak charged Balaam, in effect, 
with breach of contract and refused to pay the promised “honor” or, 
honorarium.42  Balaam replied that he never had agreed to curse Israel in 
the first place, so there was no contract to breach.43  There apparently had 
been no “meeting of the minds.”44 
Two contractual arrangements are mentioned in the Apocryphal Book 
of Tobit.  The first of these involves Tobit hiring a man to accompany his 
son, Tobias, on a journey.45  In that instance, the parties agreed to fairly 
 
 34. Genesis 25:33. 
 35. See Genesis 25:34 (“Thus Esau despised his birthright”). 
 36. See KASTELY ET AL., supra note 4, at 552; CORBIN 1952, supra note 4, at 320 
(discussing generally the concept of duress). 
 37. Genesis 29:15–29:20, 30:25–30:34. 
 38. Genesis 29:21–29:27, 30:35–30:36. 
 39. See KASTELY ET AL., supra note 4, at 571–608; CORBIN 1952, supra note 4, at 10–
11, 320 (providing an overview of the status of the law on misrepresentation and fraud and 
their consequences as to the binding effect of contracts). 
 40. Numbers 22–24; see also RICHARD H. HIERS, THE TRINITY GUIDE TO THE BIBLE 
50–51 (2001). 
 41. Numbers 22:16–22:17 (RSV). 
 42. Numbers 24:10–24:11 (RSV). 
 43. See Numbers 24:12–24:13 (“And Balaam said to Balak, ‘Did I not tell your 
messengers whom you sent to me, ‘If Balak should give me his house full of silver and gold, 
I would not be able to go beyond the word of the LORD, to do either good or bad of my own 
will; what the LORD says, that is what I will say’?”). 
 44. Id.  
 45. Tobit 5:3–5:15. 
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specific terms.  Tobit addressed a man named Azariah:46 “‘But tell me, 
what wages am I to pay you—a drachma a day, and expenses for yourself 
as for my son?  And besides, I will add to your wages if you both return 
safe and sound.’  So they agreed to these terms.”47  Later in the story, when 
Tobias spent the night with Raguel, a family relative, it was arranged that 
Tobias would marry Raguel’s daughter, Sarah.48  This story has many 
points of interest, but the one to be noted here is that as part of the marriage 
formalities, Raguel proceeded to write a contract to which both he and his 
wife, Edna, set their seals.49  Whether this contract related directly to the 
wedding, or to a possible dowry, or perhaps to arrangements for 
inheritance50 is not indicated.  Notably, both Raguel and Edna “set their 
seals” to the contract,51 indicating that both the father and the mother of the 
bride had legal status to enter into contractual agreements.52  While rarely 
used in modern times, seals are still sometimes applied to contracts.53  At 
least one contract is described in the New Testament.   
This is in Jesus’ Parable of the Laborers in the Vineyard.54  The 
parable begins: “For the kingdom of heaven is like a landowner who went 
out early in the morning to hire laborers for his vineyard.  After agreeing 
with the laborers for a denarius a day (RSV), he sent them into his 
vineyard.”55  As the day went on, the owner hired more workers, but at the 
end of the day, paid each—including those who had worked only the last 
hour, a full denarius.56  The workers who had “borne the burden of the day 
and the scorching heat” complained that the others received the same pay.57  
The owner then points out that they had agreed to these terms, and 
therefore, they had no grounds to complain.58  He then told one of them: 
“Friend, I am doing you no wrong; did you not agree with me for the usual 
daily wage?”59 
 
 46. As the story is told, Azariah was actually the angel, Raphael, in disguise.  Tobit 
5:4–5:13. 
 47. Tobit 5:14–5:15 (RSV).  
 48. Tobit 6:9–7:11 (RSV). 
 49. Tobit 7:11–7:14 (RSV). 
 50. See Tobit 14:12–14:13; see also HIERS, supra note 3, at 25–59 (discussing 
inheritance of property in biblical law). 
 51.  Tobit 7:11–7:14. 
 52. See 1 Samuel 25:14–25:35 (describing Abigail’s negotiating an agreement with 
David to spare the male members of her household—there was no formal contract, but there 
was a “meeting of the minds,” and at the end, David granted Abigail’s “petition”). 
 53. See CORBIN 1952, supra note 4, at 337–38. 
 54. Matthew 20:1–20:16. 
 55. Matthew 20:1–20:2. 
 56. Matthew 20:9–20:10. 
 57. Matthew 20:11–20:12. 
 58. Matthew 20:13. 
 59. Matthew 20:13. 
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From these accounts, it seems likely that contractual arrangements 
were commonplace in the biblical period, although biblical commentators 
rarely refer to these arrangements as contracts or instances of contract law. 
C. Overlap Between Contract and Tort Law 
Some of the wrongful acts described in biblical tradition can be 
characterized in modern legal terms either as breaches of contract or as 
“torts.”  Modern legal scholars, noting occasional overlap between contract 
and tort law, sometimes humorously refer to these acts as “con-torts.”60  
Exodus 22:7–22:11 includes various instances of “breach of trust” or 
violation of a bailee’s responsibility to care adequately for property 
entrusted to him by another.  Some of these laws also refer to activities that 
in modern law would be called the tort of embezzlement or conversion.  
Although these laws involve elements of contract—for instance, implicit 
prior agreements of one kind and another61—in this Article these laws are 
considered under the rubric of tort law. 
II. BIBLICAL TORT LAWS AND REMEDIES 
Biblical texts do not use the term “tort,” nor do most biblical 
commentators.62  Nevertheless, the term may aptly characterize several 
biblical laws.  The word “tort” probably derives from the French, tort, 
meaning “wrong.”63  In law, the term refers to acts resulting in injury to 
persons or damage to property.  Remedies are usually in the form of 
compensation paid to the injured party as “damages” or restitution for that 
which has been taken or destroyed.64 
In Anglo-American statutory and common law, torts are classified as 
either negligent or intentional.  Intentional torts, including those resulting 
from reckless endangerment to others, are considered more serious than 
harms resulting from mere negligence.65  Intentional tortfeasors and those 
found to have committed acts of reckless endangerment are sometimes 
 
 60. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, at 655–
76 (discussing the complex relation between these two categories of modern civil law). 
 61. See, e.g., Exodus 22:14–22:15, discussed infra II.A; see also infra note 140 and 
accompanying text. 
 62. Bible dictionaries typically do not list or describe “tort” laws.  Commentators 
sometimes refer to “civil laws.”  See DALE PATRICK, OLD TESTAMENT LAW 76–79 (1985) 
(identifying instances of “civil tort”); CHRISTOPHER J. H. WRIGHT, OLD TESTAMENT ETHICS 
FOR THE PEOPLE OF GOD 283–94 (2004). 
 63. See THE CONCISE OXFORD FRENCH DICTIONARY 821 (1950) (translating tort as 
follows: “wrong, injustice, mischief, harm, injury”). 
 64. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “tort” as “[a] civil 
wrong, other than breach of contract, for which a remedy may be obtained, usually in the 
form of damages”).  See also PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, at 
1–7 (discussing, in-depth, what constitutes a tort). 
 65. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, at 33–
107. 
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subjected to additional “damages,” typically in the form of multiple, 
“punitive,” or “exemplary” damages, payable to the victim or, if the victim 
is deceased, to the victim’s estate.66  The implicit rationale for awarding 
such damages is to deter people from engaging in similar, future conduct, 
lest others in the community be harmed.  Punitive damages are sometimes 
considered “quasi-criminal” in that they combine both compensation for 
the victim and punishment for the offending tortfeasor.  Modern tort law 
also distinguishes between tortious conduct that is harmful to persons, and 
tortious conduct that damages property. 
A. The Main Collection of Biblical Tort Laws: Exodus 21:18—22:17 
One of the earliest biblical law codes was the Covenant Code, found 
in Exodus 20:1–23:33.  This collection of laws contains an extended listing 
of criminal acts and penalties along with civil offenses and remedies.67  
Commentators often describe these laws as a hodge-podge, or at best as a 
loosely organized assortment of miscellaneous provisions.68  However, 
when modern jurisprudential concepts are applied, the laws found in 
Exodus 21:12–22:17 appear to have been organized along lines that 
correspond closely to contemporary legal categories. 
The laws set out in Exodus 21:12–21:32 relate to acts adversely 
affecting persons, while those found in Exodus 21:33–22:15 concern 
injuries or damages to property.  These laws can be seen to have been 
further organized as follows: 
1.  Criminal law: offenses against persons.69 
2.  Civil law: tort offenses.70  
 a.  Acts causing injuries to or death of persons.71 
       i.  Intentional infliction of harm.72 
      ii. Negligent and reckless infliction of harm.73 
 b.  Injuries to animals belonging to others through negligent or 
      reckless conduct.74 
     i.  Leaving an open pit.75 
 
 66. See id. at 7–15.  See also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, 1062–64 (2000). 
 67. Exodus 21:12–22:27. 
 68. See, e.g., 1 THE NEW INTERPRETERS’ BIBLE 860–66 (1994) (commenting on the 
Covenant Code (Exod. 20:24–23:19): “It is a miscellaneous collection . . . . It is not possible 
to identify a coherent structure, pattern, or order for the material.”). Id. at 863–66.  
Nevertheless, the article goes on to identify several categories of laws, though without 
mentioning either civil law or tort law.  Id. 
 69. Exodus 21:12–21:17. 
 70. Exodus 21:18–22:17. 
 71. Exodus 21:18–21:32. 
 72. Exodus 21:18–21:21, 21:26–21:27. 
 73. Exodus 21:22, 21:28–21:32. 
 74. Exodus 21:33–21:36. 
 75. Exodus 21:33–21:34. 
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     ii. One man’s ox fatally injures another’s.76 
 c. Intentional and negligent conduct affecting animals and 
     other property.77 
     i. Theft of cattle (farm animals).78  
     ii. Allowing animals to graze over neighbors’ fields or 
          crops.79 
    iii.  Allowing fire to spread and damage neighbors’ crops.80 
    iv.  Failing to care for property in trust or bailment.81 
    v.   Property damaged or lost while borrowed.82 
 d. Seduction of a virgin who is not betrothed.83 
It is clear that these laws were not recorded in random order, but 
rather organized on the basis of principles that correspond to distinctions 
found in modern tort law classifications.84   
1. Tort Laws Relating to Injuries or the Death of Persons 
The collection of laws found in Exodus 21:12–21:32 begins with a 
series of criminal laws all of which have to do with offenses against 
persons, and all but one85 of which offenses constitute capital crimes.86  
 
 76. Exodus 21:35–21:36. 
 77. Exodus 22:1–21:15. 
 78. Exodus 22:1, 21:4.  See also Exodus 22:2–22:3.  This passage concerns liability, if 
any, for killing someone who “broke in” possibly to steal cattle.  The placement of these 
verses here is logical because they probably had to do with cattle thieves or “rustlers,” the 
subject of the intertwined verses, Exodus 22:1, 22:4.  See infra notes 124 & 180. 
 79. Exodus 22:5. 
 80. Exodus 22:6. 
 81. Exodus 22:7–22:13. 
 82. Exodus 22:14–22:15. 
 83. Exodus 22:16–22:17.  As will be discussed, infra, an important part of this tort is 
failure to pay the marriage gift. 
 84. See NOAB-RSV, supra note 1, at 94–95.  The annotator correctly observes that the 
laws in Exodus 21:12–21:32 relate to “protecting human beings,” while those in Exodus 
21:33–22:17 deal with damage to property.  See also HARPER’S BIBLE COMMENTARY 149 
(James L. Mays ed., 1988) (regarding the organizational pattern in Exodus 21:1–22:17:  
The laws are grouped roughly as follows: (1) laws pertaining to slavery, requiring 
a seventh-year manumission of Hebrew slaves and restricting the sale of daughters 
(21:1–11); (2) laws of capital crimes (21:12–17), excepting unintentional 
homicide but including murder (21:12–14), kidnapping (21:16), and crimes 
against parents (21:15, 17); (3) laws pertaining to personal injuries, including 
injuries to slaves, inflicted by other human beings (21:18–27) and by livestock 
(21:28–32); (4) laws pertaining to damages to property (21:33–15), including 
livestock (21:33–36, 22:3) and real estate (22:5–6); (5) laws involving contracts 
(22:7–15); and (6) laws regarding the payment of the bride-price (22:16–17)). 
Id. 
 85. Exodus 21:13 (providing an exception where the offender “did not lie in wait” for 
the victim, “but God let him fall into his hand” (RSV)).  See also HIERS, supra note 3, at 89–
90 (suggesting that this exception would likely be categorized in modern law as relating to 
second-degree murder). 
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These laws include intentional homicide,87 striking one’s father or 
mother,88 kidnapping,89 and cursing either parent.90  Likewise, the tort laws 
in the following verses concern acts that adversely affect persons.91 
Exodus 21:18–21:19 provides that if two men fight and one seriously 
injures the other who then becomes incapacitated for a period of time, the 
man who caused the injury “shall pay for the loss of [the victim’s] time, 
and shall have him thoroughly healed.”92  These provisions evidently 
required payment for earnings lost while the injured man was unable to 
work, and also for his medical expenses.  There is no mention of qualifying 
factors such as which man started the fight, the merits of their respective 
arguments, or whether one acted in self defense.  The law simply stated that 
the man who was not incapacitated would pay the other’s damages.  This 
law might also have been intended to deter brawling, since those so 
engaged would be on notice that they could be liable for the kinds of 
damages indicated if they caused serious injury to others. 
The law found in Exodus 21:20–21:21 falls more closely into the 
category of criminal law because it calls for the punishment of the offender 
as opposed to the offender paying damages or making restitution.  This law 
provided that a man was to be punished if he struck his slave, whether male 
or female, and the slave died immediately afterward.93  If, however, the 
slave “survive[d] a day or two” before dying, the man who struck him was 
not to be punished, the rationale being that the slave was “his money.”94  In 
either case, the slave owner was free from liability for tort damages, there 
being no provision for compensating the victim’s relatives.  This law was 
probably included there because it, like others in Exodus 21:18–21:32, 
concerns injuries to persons. 
Exodus 21:22–21:25 describes what was to be done if a brawl broke 
out—a circumstance that was perhaps quite common at the time.  If rowdy 
men were brawling, and while doing so, they injured a married, pregnant 
 
 86. The entire block of laws found in Exodus 21:18 through 22:17, is followed by 
another brief set of capital laws (Exod. 22:18–22:20).  See HIERS, supra note 3, at 86–126 
(discussing these and other laws calling for the death penalty). 
 87. Exodus 21:12, 21:14. 
 88. Exodus 21:15. 
 89. Exodus 21:16. 
 90. Exodus 21:17.  In the ancient Near East—and in some modern time cultures—
cursing a person was believed to inflict serious, tangible harm.  See, e.g., Numbers 22:6, 
22:11. 
 91. Exodus 21:18–21:32. 
 92. Damages for lost wages and medical expenses are also available under modern tort 
law.  See DOBBS, supra, note 66, at 1048–50.  “Time (or ‘maintenance’) and cure” are 
common remedies in modern admiralty or maritime law for seamen injured in the course of 
employment.  See GRANT GILMORE AND CHARLES J. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 
281–314 (2d ed. 1975). 
 93. Exodus 21:20. 
 94. Exodus 21:21 (RSV). 
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woman thereby causing a miscarriage, but without committing any other 
harm, “the one” who caused the injury was to be fined an amount set by the 
woman’s husband, as then determined by “the judges.”95  Apparently these 
damages were paid in compensation for the loss of the fetus or unborn 
child.96  This provision can be considered a matter of tort law.  However, if 
the woman was injured or died as a result of such injury, the criminal 
sanction known as the “lex talionis” was to be applied, and the perpetrator 
punished accordingly.97 
Exodus 21:26–21:27 governs situations where a man struck his male 
or female slave, causing the loss of either an eye or a tooth.  In that event, 
he was required to let the slave go free as compensation for the injury.98  
Such compensation is in the nature of a tort remedy.  Even though slaves 
were regarded as property,99 slave owners or masters were not at liberty to 
abuse them.100 
Laws applicable to another special situation are set out in Exodus 
21:28–21:32.  These laws detail the legal consequence when an ox fatally 
gores someone other than its owner.101  In cases where the owner of the 
goring ox is culpably negligent and in effect, guilty of reckless 
endangerment, the owner is subject to the death penalty, with two 
exceptions.102  Both exceptions provide what are now called tort remedies.  
One exception is that the victim’s family could choose to accept 
compensation (“ransom”) in lieu of capital punishment.103  Such ransom 
might be very substantial, possibly including some equivalent to punitive or 
pain and suffering damages.  In modern law, this provision allows for a 
civil “wrongful death action” in tort.104  The second exception is that if the 
victim was a slave, the offending ox’s owner was to pay the slave’s owner 
 
 95. Exodus 21:22–21:25 (RSV). 
 96. See HIERS, supra note 3, at 90–91.  This is the only biblical law that relates, albeit 
indirectly, to abortion.  The only other biblical text that also relates only indirectly to 
abortion is Ecclesiastes 6:3–6:5, commenting positively about the fate of the “stillborn 
child.” 
 97. Lex talionis means “law of retaliation” or punishment equivalent to the injury 
caused by the perpetrator.  Exodus 21:23–21:25 is sometimes cited by proponents of capital 
punishment in support of generalized application of the death penalty, as if its context set 
out explicitly in Exodus 21:21–21:23 made no difference.  The other two instances of the lex 
talionis found in biblical law likewise were to apply only in delimited contexts: Leviticus 
24:19–24:20 (mayhem, or permanently disfiguring another), and Deuteronomy 19:16–19:21 
(intentional, false, malicious testimony).  See HIERS, supra note 3, at 146–51. 
 98. Exodus 21:26–21:27. 
 99. Exodus 21:20–21:21. 
 100. See Exodus 21:1–21:11; HIERS, supra note 3, at 204–11. 
 101. Exodus 21:28–21:32. 
 102. See HIERS, supra note 3, at 91–92. 
 103. Exodus 21:30. 
 104. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, at 945–46. 
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thirty silver shekels, evidently as compensatory damages for loss of his 
property.105 
2. Tort Laws Relating to Injury or Damage to Animals and Other 
Property 
The second set of tort laws are those found in Exodus 21:33–22:15.  
These laws govern a series of tort offenses that affect property, and set 
forth the appropriate remedial damages in each case.106  For the most part, 
these laws are placed in groupings that correspond closely to two modern 
Anglo-American classes of tort law: torts involving simple negligence;107 
and those where the tortfeasor may have acted intentionally.108 
Offenses that involve simple negligence are enumerated in Exodus 
21:33–21:35.  These laws call only for restitution or compensation in kind 
equivalent to the value of what was lost or destroyed.  Such compensation 
was required if a farm animal was killed by falling into someone’s open 
pit.109  In this case, the pit owner kept the dead animal.110  In effect, this is a 
sale: the pit owner bought the dead animal for the value it had when alive.  
In this situation, it was foreseeable that an animal might fall into such a pit 
and be killed.  Foreseeable risk of harm is a basic element in modern tort 
law.  Quid pro quo, or equal compensation, was also required in the 
following situations: if a man’s cattle grazed over another’s field or 
vineyard;111 if a man set a fire that accidentally spreads to a neighbor’s 
grain field;112 and if a farm animal was stolen, injured, or died while in the 
borrower’s, or bailee’s, possession.113  These kinds of cases are considered 
further below. 
A somewhat different situation arose when one man’s ox fatally 
injured another man’s ox.114  Here the live ox was sold and the two owners 
divided the proceeds of the sale, and they also divided the dead animal.115  
Arguably, this was less than full compensation for the man whose ox was 
killed.  One could speculate that this arrangement may be in the nature of a 
“no fault” settlement, given the probable difficulty of determining whose 
ox “started it.”  If, however, the owner of the goring ox knew of its goring 
propensities, yet failed to fence it in, he was to pay “ox for ox,” but could 
 
 105. Exodus 21:32. 
 106. With the exception of Exodus 22:2–22:3.  See infra note 124. 
 107. Exodus 21:33–21:36. 
 108. Exodus 22:1, 22:4, 22:7–22:13, 22:16. 
 109. Exodus 21:33–21:34. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, at 542–43 
(discussing liability and “strict liability” for damage done by trespassing livestock). 
 112. See id. at 543–45. 
 113. Exodus 22:5–22:6, 22:12, 22:14. 
 114. Exodus 21:35. 
 115. Id. 
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keep the dead animal.116  This settlement also is in the nature of a sale: the 
tortfeasor in effect bought the dead animal for the price of a live one.  As in 
the case of the pit owner, there was some element of culpable negligence 
because it also would have been foreseeable that harm could result—for an 
ox that had been “accustomed to gore in the past”117 was likely to do so 
again given the opportunity.118 
Likewise, two tort laws discussed below involve culpable and, 
arguably, reckless negligence, and require the negligent tortfeasor to make 
restitution.  These are found, respectively, in verses five and six of Exodus 
22.  The first of these governs cases where someone negligently—or 
perhaps intentionally—caused or allowed his cattle to graze over someone 
else’s field or vineyard.119  The fact that the required restitution was to 
come from “the best” in the tortfeasor’s field or vineyard suggests that the 
activity described in the first part of verse five was considered intentional: 
“causes [another’s]120 field or vineyard to be grazed over.”121  Requiring 
the cattle owner to provide “the best” of his own crops as compensation 
may be understood as a form of punitive damages.   
The other law concerned situations where fire—presumably started on 
a landowner’s own property—was allowed to get out of control and 
destroyed grain or hay on a neighbor’s field.122  Here, because fire can be 
such a serious hazard, it may be that the landowner was held to a higher 
standard of care and that allowing fire to spread would mark his failure to 
meet that standard.  Some other tort laws regarding simple, yet culpable 
negligence, found in Exodus 22:11–22:15, are discussed below. 
Exodus 22:1–22:11 includes several laws relating to property where 
the tortfeasor either acted, or was suspected of acting intentionally.  As is 
the case in some types of modern tort law where the offense, or tort, is 
clearly intentional, biblical tort law required the tortfeasor to pay multiple 
damages.  Such offenses included theft, breach of trust, and embezzlement 
or conversion.123  Instances of intentional torts calling for double damages 
included the following: (1) if someone stole another’s ox, ass, or sheep and 
the animals were “found alive in the thief’s possession”;124 (2) if a thief 
 
 116. Exodus 21:36. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, at 542–43 
(demonstrating that this concept also exists in modern tort law). 
 119. Exodus 22:5. 
 120. Id. (emphasis added).  That it is someone else’s field or vineyard is implicit in the 
fact that the owner of the cattle was required to make restitution.  Doing so would not be an 
issue if his cattle grazed on his own land. 
 121. Exodus 22:5. 
 122. Exodus 22:6. 
 123. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, at 88–90 
(commenting on the development of modern Western tort law regarding “conversion”). 
 124. Exodus 22:4.  See also Exodus 22:2–22:3 (describing what was to be done if 
someone fatally struck a thief “found breaking in”).  These verses indicate whether the 
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stole money or property that had been placed in a neighbor’s 
safekeeping;125 or (3) in cases that involved “breach of trust” or possession 
of disputed property determined to belong to the other party.126  If the 
stolen ox or sheep has been slaughtered or sold, quintuple or quadruple 
damages, respectively, were required.127  According to Proverbs 6:30–6:31, 
which may have been intended as hyperbole, if a thief was caught, “he 
[would] pay sevenfold.”128  The idea of multiple damages for intentional 
wrong-doing is illustrated in the prophet Nathan’s encounter with King 
David as described in 2 Samuel 12:1–12:6.  Nathan told King David a 
story129 about a rich man who had taken a poor man’s pet lamb and then 
killed and served it for dinner.130  King David was also Chief Judge.  
Outraged by this story, King David declared that the rich man should 
“restore the lamb fourfold, because he did this thing, and because he had no 
pity.”131  Fourfold restitution was also exemplified in the New Testament 
where it was said that a man named Zacchaeus voluntarily declared that if 
he had “defrauded any one of anything, [he] restore[d] it fourfold.”132 
Exodus 22:8–22:11 relates to possible or suspected instances of 
embezzlement or “conversion” of property held in trust or “bailment” for 
another.  Such conduct would, again, constitute an intentional tort.  
Liability in each case depends upon the particular circumstances.  If goods 
or money were stolen while entrusted to a neighbor and the thief was not 
found, the neighbor or bailee should have “come near to God” in order to 
“show whether or not” he had taken it.133  Similarly, “[i]f a man deliver[ed] 
to his neighbor an ass or an ox or a sheep or any beast to keep, and it die[d] 
 
person who so killed a thief was liable for homicide, a criminal offense.  Under this law, the 
night-time thief (or burglar) assumed the risk of being killed by the property owner or his 
agents, and the property owner was absolved of either criminal or tort liability.  This law 
evidently was inserted between verses 1 and 4, which relate to theft, because they also refer 
to theft.  See HIERS, supra note 3, at 92.  “Breaking in” here may refer to entering either a 
house or a barn, or even possibly a farmyard, or enclosed pasture for the purpose of stealing 
animals of the sort referred to in verses 1 and 4. 
 125. Exodus 22:7. 
 126. Exodus 22:9 (RSV). 
 127. Exodus 22:1.  But see, e.g., Exodus 22:1 (RSV) (stating that if the thief was unable 
to make restitution or pay damages because “he ha[d] nothing,” he was to be sold as a 
slave).  Evidently stealing and killing or selling an ox or sheep was regarded as a 
particularly serious offense, which would be met with punitive or quasi-criminal damages or 
penalties.   
 128. Proverbs 6:30–6:31 (RSV). 
 129. 2 Samuel 12:1–12:4.  Nathan told the story, or parable, to catch the conscience of 
the king: the story is really about David’s murdering Uriah, and taking the murdered man’s 
wife, Bathsheba, as his own new wife.  2 Samuel 12:7–12:9. 
  130. Id. 
 131. 2 Samuel 12:6 (RSV).  The Hebrew word, rechem, here translated as “pity” can 
equally well be translated as “compassion.” 
 132. Luke 19:8 (RSV). 
 133. Exodus 22:8 (RSV). 
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or [was] hurt or [was] driven away, without anyone seeing it . . . [,]” the 
accused may have been absolved of suspicion by taking “an oath by the 
LORD” which would determine “whether he ha[d] not put his hand to his 
neighbor’s property.”134  The animal’s owner was to “accept the oath,” 
thereby settling the matter.135    
Laws in Exodus 22:10–22:15 deal with situations where there was no 
question of intentional wrong-doing, and the appropriate remedy was 
restitution.  Restitution would be required if an animal was stolen while in 
the neighbor’s possession.136  Evidently it was assumed that the animal 
would not have been stolen but for the neighbor’s negligence.  However, if 
there was evidence that the animal had been “torn by beasts” (RSV) there 
would be no need for restitution.137  On the other hand, if someone 
borrowed a farm animal of any kind and the animal was injured or died, 
“the owner not being present,” the borrower must make “full restitution.”138  
But if the animal had been hired (or rented) and its owner was present with 
it, no restitution was required.139  In these cases where no restitution or 
compensation was called for, the reason seems to be that the person in 
possession of the animals at the time was presumed not to have been at 
fault.140  None of these occurrences is described as “an act of God,” an 
expression sometimes used in supposedly secular Anglo-American law, 
referencing unforeseeable harmful happenings or accidents.141 
3. Seduction of a Virgin who is not Betrothed 
Exodus 22:16–22:17, concerning what is to be done when “a man 
seduces a virgin who is not betrothed,”142 can be read in the context of the 
preceding series of tort laws to imply that virgin daughters are regarded as 
their father’s property.  However, it is also plausible to see this as a 
separate tort category.  The injury or tortious action described here consists 
of two parts: (1) sexual intercourse with the young woman—albeit with her 
consent—but without marrying her; and (2) failure to give the requisite 
marriage present.  The latter, at any rate, is a property matter.  The law 
 
 134. Exodus 22:10–22:11 (RSV). 
 135. Exodus 22:11. 
 136. Exodus 22:12. 
 137. Exodus 22:13. 
 138. Exodus 22:14 (RSV). 
 139. Exodus 22:14–22:15. 
 140. In cases when the farm animal had been either borrowed or hired, it seems to have 
been understood that if the owner came along with it, the owner was considered responsible 
for the animal’s well-being.  Moreover, in a case where the animal had been hired, it was 
understood that the owner, as an implicit term of the rental contract, assumed any risk that it 
might be injured or die. 
 141. Compare with Exodus 21:12–21:13 (attributing one particular circumstance to 
God’s action), discussed supra note 85.  See DOBBS, supra note 66, at 474 (discussing “acts 
of God” in modern tort law). 
 142. Exodus 22:16–22:17 (RSV). 
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accordingly provided a two-fold remedy: (1) the man was required to marry 
the woman; and (2) he was required to give a marriage present, unless her 
father disapproved of the would-be suitor,143 in which case the ex-suitor 
was required to pay an equivalent sum.144  Whether or not the law implied 
that virgin daughters were considered their father’s or parents’ property,145 
it definitely provided that men who seduced and engaged in pre-marital 
sexual intercourse with such daughters were required to remedy their 
misdeeds by making suitable property settlements, whether or not marriage 
subsequently took place. 
None of the tort laws found in Exodus 21:18–22:17 are repeated in 
later laws or law codes.  The biblical compilers or editors evidently 
regarded the laws set out here as definitive.  Only a few other tort laws are 
to be found in later biblical codes. 
B. Other Biblical Tort Laws 
Another biblical law is found in the Holiness Code, and is repeated 
twice: “He who kills a beast shall make it good.”146  Here, as in several 
laws found in the Covenant Code, the prescribed remedy was equal 
compensation, whether in kind or by payment of equivalent value.147  This 
law did not distinguish between intentional and negligent killing of 
another’s “beast.” 
Deuteronomy 25:1 is another law that can be applied to both civil 
litigation, and also, as suggested by the verses that follow, criminal 
activity: “Suppose two persons have a dispute and enter into litigation, and 
the judges decide between them, declaring one to be in the right and the 
other to be in the wrong.”148 
 
 143. Id.  Presumably a father’s disapproval could be based either on his own 
reservations as to the suitor’s suitability, or on his daughter’s having advised her father that 
she did not wish to marry the man after all.  Or, the young woman’s mother might 
disapprove, and convey her feelings to her husband to act upon.  See Genesis 27:46–28:5 
(where Rebekah tells Isaac, her husband, that she does not wish their son, Jacob, to marry 
one of the local Hittite or Canaanite women; whereupon Isaac dutifully sends Jacob to Aram 
(Syria) with instructions to marry one of Rebekah’s nieces instead). 
 144. Compare Exodus 22:16–22:17, with Deuteronomy 22:28–22:29.  In the latter, it 
was a question of rape, not consensual intercourse.  A specific sum was required in payment 
to the woman’s father, and marriage was mandated with no expressed provision for anyone 
opting to bar the wedding banns.  Deuteronomy 22:28–22:29.  Moreover, the man “shall not 
be permitted to divorce her as long as he lives.”  Id. 
 145. Exodus 22:16–22:17 does not specify to whom the “marriage present” or 
equivalent monetary payment was to be given. 
 146. Leviticus 24:18, 24:21 (RSV). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Deuteronomy 25:1–25:3. 
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Here, punishment,149 rather than restitution or some other form of 
compensation, is what follows.  Presumably, such punishment would have 
applied only in cases of criminal wrong-doing.  This text, unlike most 
others relating to civil actions, refers specifically to the role of “the 
judges.”150  It would seem that, if they found punishment inappropriate, the 
judges could have decided that the one who was “in the wrong” should 
have paid damages or made restitution to the one they found “to be in the 
right.” 
Anglo-American law does not provide that a person in a position to 
rescue another person from imminent harm, or to rescue another person’s 
property from likely damage, has a legal duty to do so.  Biblical law, 
however, does impose such a duty with respect to animals and other 
property.  Deuteronomy requires a person to take affirmative action to 
return a neighbor’s stray farm animals to him and to restore lost garments 
or, inclusively, “any lost thing of your brother’s which he loses and you 
find . . . .”151  Deuteronomic law also required a person to help one’s 
neighbor lift up his fallen ass or ox.152  The earlier version of this law in the 
Covenant Code even imposed a duty to restore an enemy’s stray ox or ass, 
and to help him get his ass up and on its feet if the ass had foundered under 
its burden.153 
Deuteronomic law also includes a safety requirement for the purpose 
of preventing or reducing the likelihood of foreseeable harm to persons: 
“When you build a new house, you shall make a parapet for your roof, that 
you may not bring the guilt of blood upon your house, if any one fall from 
it.”154  It is unclear whether the parapet or railing referred to here was 
meant to be a temporary safeguard to prevent workmen from falling during 
construction or a permanent architectural safety feature.  Likewise, whether 
through negligence or with intent to harm, people were not to put 
“stumbling block[s]” or obstacles in the path of blind persons.155  These 
 
 149. Deuteronomy 25:2–25:3.  “If the one in the wrong deserves to be flogged, the 
judge shall make that person lie down and be beaten in his presence with the number of 
lashes proportionate to the offense.  Forty lashes may be given but not more; if more lashes 
than these are given, your brother (RSV) will be degraded in your sight.”  Id.  The law 
shows concern lest even the most serious offender be beaten with more than a maximum 
(albeit a harsh number) of lashes, and thereby suffer undue humiliation.  It is noteworthy 
that the offender is characterized here as the plaintiff’s “brother” (Hebrew: ‘ach, which can 
also mean “friend,” “relative,” or “neighbor”). 
 150. Id.;  see also Exodus 21:22. 
 151. Deuteronomy 22:1–22:3 (RSV).  “Finders keepers” did not apply if the finder 
knew who the owner was.  See also Leviticus 6:3, quoted infra text accompanying note 158. 
 152. Deuteronomy 22:4. 
 153. Exodus 23:4–23:5. 
 154. Deuteronomy 22:8 (RSV). 
 155. Leviticus 19:14.  Nor were they to “curse the deaf.”  Id.  It might or might not have 
been believed that a deaf person would be harmed physically by being cursed, but such a 
person undoubtedly would suffer indignity before others.  Both kinds of malicious activity 
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laws156 should be classified as civil or public safety laws, rather than as tort 
laws; however, both were clearly intended to protect members of the 
community from injuries that could result in tort claims, and both illustrate 
the element of “foreseeability.”157 
A later collection of laws, known as the Priestly Code, lists various 
intentional torts involving inanimate property, such as “deceiving [a] 
neighbor in a matter of deposit or security, or through robbery, or if he has 
oppressed his neighbor or has found what was lost and lied about it . . . .”158  
Here, the remedy is full restitution of the property in question together with 
one-fifth, or twenty percent, in punitive damages.159  In addition, the 
perpetrator must bring a “guilt offering” to “the priest.”160  A different, and 
possibly earlier version of the same law implies that if the victim of the tort 
was no longer alive, restitution should be made to the victim’s kinsman, 
then if there were no kinsman, the restitution, along with a sacrificial 
offering, must be given to the “Lord for the priest.”161 
All of these “tort” laws and remedies were evidently meant to fairly 
allocate the burdens of liability.  The interests of both parties enter into the 
equation: those who did the wrong, and those to whom it had been done.  
The emphasis here is on justice, but compassion may be implicit as well 
because once damages—including punitive damages—were paid, the 
parties could again get on with their lives.  There was no provision for 
humiliating, ostracizing, jailing, or exiling wrongdoers who adequately 
compensated the persons they had injured. 
 
III. BIBLICAL CONTRACT AND TORT LAW, AND MODERN 
JURISPRUDENTIAL COUNTERPARTS 
Biblical scholars for the most part are unfamiliar with modern Anglo-
American legal concepts and categories.  It is not surprising, therefore, that 
such concepts and categories are rarely mentioned in Bible commentaries.  
It is, however, surprising to find how closely many biblical laws 
approximate certain basic features of modern contract and tort 
jurisprudence.  Legal scholars and lawyers seem generally unaware of these 
parallels. 
 
prohibited in Leviticus 19:14 might have been considered “practical jokes” by persons of 
warped mentality.  See Proverbs 26:18–26:19 (“Like a maniac who shoots deadly firebrands 
and arrows, is one who deceived his neighbor, and says ‘I am only joking!’”). 
 156. Deuteronomy 22:8; Leviticus 19:14.  See also Deuteronomy 27:18 (“Cursed be he 
who misleads a blind man on the road.”). 
 157. Such laws could also be classified in modern terms as “social legislation.”  See 
HIERS, supra note 3, at 165–218 (discussing biblical social legislation). 
 158. Leviticus 6:2–6:3 (RSV). 
 159. Leviticus 6:4–6:5. 
 160. Leviticus 6:6–6:7. 
 161. Numbers 5:5–5:10. 
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Biblical laws and narratives clearly indicate that in order to form a 
contract, both parties must agree to its terms.  The terms normally specify 
the goods, services, money, or other valuables that each party undertakes to 
give to the other as “consideration.”  Typically one party (or person) will 
propose terms; it is then up to the other to either agree to these terms or 
reject them.  This pattern of offer and acceptance, constituting agreement as 
to the “considerations” to be exchanged, is a standard feature of modern 
contract law.  It is illustrated in a number of biblical narratives, most 
notably, Jacob’s offer to sell his brother, Esau, a bowl of stew in exchange 
for the other’s birthright;162 Jacob and Laban’s agreement to terms of a 
labor contract—seven years of labor in exchange for marriage to each of 
Laban’s daughters;163 Jacob’s subsequent agreement to work for Laban in 
exchange for all the spotted and striped sheep and goats in addition to the 
black lambs subsequently born among Laban’s flocks;164 Balak’s offer to 
Balaam of an unspecified fee if he would go and curse Israel;165 and Tobit’s 
hiring of a companion for a drachma a day, plus expenses and a possible 
bonus if he would accompany his son Tobias on an important journey.166    
Laws governing contractual arrangements were evidently intended to 
prevent exploitation or mistreatment of persons who might not otherwise 
be able to defend their own interests because they lacked equal bargaining 
position or power.167  Likewise, latter-day Anglo-American law affords 
protection for such persons, both through constitutional and legislative 
enactments and by declining to enforce “contracts of adhesion,” that is, 
contracts where one party had little or no choice but to accept unfavorable 
terms.  Unlike Anglo-American law, however, biblical law did not include 
provisions for voiding contracts on the basis of mistake, duress or fraud. 
Like biblical contract laws, biblical tort laws also parallel modern 
counterparts with respect to certain related distinctions and “elements,” as 
well as underlying concerns, values, or purposes that the laws serve to 
effectuate.  These elements appear to have included: a duty of care, or a 
duty to avoid harming others or their property; some breach of that duty, 
whether intentional or negligent; “proximate cause;” and “foreseeability.” 
It would seem that in order to state a claim in tort under biblical law, 
the plaintiff must have been able to show that the other party had a duty of 
care as to the plaintiff’s interests and somehow breached that duty.  For 
 
 162. Genesis 25:29–25:34. 
 163. Genesis 29:21–29:30. 
 164. Genesis 30:25–30:43. 
 165. Numbers 22–24. 
 166. Tobit 5:14–5:16.  See also Matthew 20:1–20:14 (describing where, in Jesus’ 
parable, a landowner and workers agree to terms for a day’s labor).  
 167. Such laws related to the rights or interests of slaves, Exodus 21:1–21:11, debtors, 
Exodus 22:25–22:27, Deuteronomy 24:6, 24:10–24:13, day laborers, Leviticus 19:13, 
Deuteronomy 24:14–24:15, widows, Deuteronomy 24:17–24:18, and needy indigents, 
Leviticus 25:35–25:37.   
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instance, a landowner engaged in field-burning would owe his neighbors a 
duty of care to prevent fire from spreading into their adjoining fields.  If 
such a fire did so spread, it would be treated as a breach of this duty of 
care.  Moreover, the plaintiff must prove “proximate cause,” that is, a direct 
connection of some sort between the alleged tortfeasor’s acts and the 
resulting injury or damage to another person or his property.  For instance, 
leaving an open pit, or failing to control a fire adjacent to another’s field, 
would constitute proximate cause for resulting accidents.  Proximate cause 
is closely linked to “foreseeability.”  A “reasonable, prudent person” 
should be able to foresee when the situation he or she has created or 
allowed to exist is likely to be the proximate cause of injury or damage.168 
Foreseeability is another basic element or feature of both biblical and 
modern tort law.  Foreseeability requires that in order for a person to be 
liable for wrong-doing, the person whose conduct resulted in the harm 
should have been “reasonably” aware that his or her conduct could have 
had harmful consequences of the sort that resulted.169  Several laws relate to 
cases of simple negligence, where the consequences were not intended, but 
nevertheless could be foreseen.  For instance, when someone’s cattle were 
allowed to graze over another’s field or vineyard,170 or a farmer allowed an 
ass or sheep to be stolen while in his safekeeping.171  In such cases, the law 
called for relief in the form of restitution or equivalent compensation.  One 
distinctive biblical law required those responsible for new construction to 
provide safety railings, and another prohibited placing obstacles in the way 
of blind persons, in both instances in order to prevent or reduce the risk of 
foreseeable harm to others.172  
These elements are all present, explicitly or implicitly, in the biblical 
tort laws considered above.  In addition, as has been seen, biblical laws set 
out an affirmative duty to assist others under certain circumstances.  Like 
modern tort law, many biblical laws were intended to provide relief or 
compensation to persons who were injured, or whose property was 
damaged or destroyed as a result of another person’s conduct.  As in 
modern tort law, though not expressed in these typically modern terms, the 
purpose of remedial “damages” or restitution was to “make the other 
person whole.”  Like modern tort law, Biblical law provided that, in certain 
circumstances, persons could recover damages for medical expenses and 
loss of income during recovery. 
The underlying values implicit in these biblical laws seem to have 
included the belief that members of the community were entitled to bodily 
integrity, to be free from being harmed by others and to be free from 
 
 168. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, at 273, 274, 280–
300; DOBBS, supra note 66, at 463–84. 
 169. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, at 280–81. 
 170. Exodus 22:5. 
 171. Exodus 22:10–22:12. 
 172. Deuteronomy 22:8; Leviticus 19:14. 
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actions by others resulting in loss of or damage to their property.  
Implicitly, each member of the community had a duty of care,173 namely, to 
avoid acting in ways that could foreseeably injure others or damage their 
property.  The dignity, worth, or value of each member of society was 
taken as a given, though sometimes with significant qualifications, as in the 
case of slaves.  These values or norms may also be implicit in modern 
Anglo-American law where, however, they are rarely articulated.  Instead, 
legal commentators prefer to refer to various amorphous “rights” that are 
presumed to be inherent, somehow, in individuals.174 
Like modern tort law, biblical law treats reckless conduct and 
intentional wrong-doing more severely than in cases of simple negligence.  
For instance, the law of lex talionis called for punishment when a married, 
pregnant woman was injured by brawling males, and there was a law 
calling for capital punishment when the owner of an ox with a history of 
goring was allowed to run loose and kill someone.  Those who engage in 
reckless endangerment could be subjected to severe, in effect, even 
criminal penalties.175  Purposeful wrongdoing or intentional torts, such as 
theft, embezzlement, or breach of trust,176 called for multiple or punitive 
damages, which are common modern law remedies for intentional torts. 
Biblical scholars generally assume that the laws found in the Covenant 
Code177 were set down at random, rather than in accordance with any 
recognizable pattern or structure based on content.  When, however, 
contemporary legal categories are used to describe the laws found in 
Exodus 21:1–22:17, it turns out that these laws appear to have been 
organized in a coherent structure after all.  The concluding paragraphs that 
follow review this structure and show how it parallels—though of course it 
was not based upon—modern Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
All of the laws found in Exodus 21:1–21:32 have to do with the 
interests of persons.  The first eleven verses,178 which constitute contract 
 
 173. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, at 356–59 
(discussing the foundation of “duty” in modern tort law). 
 174. See Max L. Stackhouse, Reflections on “Universal Absolutes,” 14 J.L. & RELIGION 
97, 98–99 (1999–2000).  Stackhouse wrote in appreciation of Michael J. Perry’s book, The 
Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries, where Perry argued—contrary to the ideology of 
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Id.  
 175. Exodus 21:22–21:25, 21:28–21:31; see also HIERS, supra note 3, at 90–92. 
 176. See Exodus 22:1, 22:4, 22:7, 22:9; Leviticus 6:1–6:5; Numbers 5:5–5:10. 
 177. Exodus 20:1–23:33. 
 178. Exodus 21:1–21:11. 
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laws, provide protection for slaves, particularly for their marital rights or 
concerns.  Likewise, the next set of laws in Exodus 21:12–21:17, which can 
be classified as criminal laws, relate to the interests of persons affected by 
the proscribed types of activity.  The laws in Exodus 21:18–21:32 are 
mainly tort laws, again relating to the interests of persons, here those who 
might suffer injury or death as a result of negligent, reckless, or intentional 
actions on the part of others. 
Some of these tort laws are accompanied by provisions calling for 
punishing offenders when, depending on various contingencies, other 
persons are seriously injured or die as the result of their tortious acts.  
Although punishment is in the nature of a criminal penalty, rather than a 
tort remedy, these punishments were intended to apply if the consequences 
of the tortfeasors’ actions crossed into the realm of criminal conduct.  Thus, 
if a man struck his slave and the slave died immediately, the slave owner 
was to be punished—presumably at the discretion of the judges.179  But if 
the slave survives, even if only for a day or two, the slave-owner was 
relieved of criminal, and probably also civil liability.180  Two kinds of 
situations involved heightened penalties for reckless endangerment of 
others.  Thus, if brawling men injured a married, pregnant woman, the man 
responsible, was subject to criminal penalties under the lex talionis, or law 
of retaliation in kind.  In the other situation, if an owner failed to keep an 
ox that had been “accustomed to gore in the past” under adequate restraint 
after due warning, and the ox then killed someone, the owner was subject 
to the death penalty, unless the family of the deceased was willing to accept 
compensation, a tort remedy, instead.181  The other laws in Exodus 21:18–
21:32 are also all in the nature of tort provisions relating to persons. 
The section that follows, Exodus 21:33–22:1, 22:4–22:15, consists of 
tort laws concerning injury, damage to, or theft of animals and other 
property.  Exodus 22:5–22:6 covers negligent damage to another’s 
agricultural interests; Exodus 22:7–22:13 governs property held in “trust” 
or bailment; and Exodus 22:14–22:15 concerns borrowed property.  These 
laws provide for various remedies, typically in the form of restitution or 
cash.  On the other hand, as with modern law, persons who committed 
intentional torts such as theft or embezzlement, were liable for multiple, 
that is punitive, damages.182  Again, as in modern jurisprudence, where 
 
 179. Exodus 21:20.  See reference to judges in Exodus 21:22.  The nature of the 
punishment options is not specified. 
 180. Exodus 21:21.  See also Exodus 22:2–22:3, considered above, as to killing cattle 
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 181. Exodus 21:28–21:31. 
 182. Exodus 22:1, 22:4, 22:7, 22:9. 
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circumstances indicated that the apparent wrong-doer was without fault, no 
restitution or damages payment was required.183  Likewise, another law 
provides, in effect, for a “no fault settlement” where an ox with no history 
of goring kills another’s ox.184  Unlike modern tort jurisprudence, biblical 
law does not make provision for comparative fault remedies where both 
parties may have been partially negligent. 
The entire block of tort laws found in Exodus 21:18–22:17 is clearly 
set apart from the capital laws immediately preceding it in Exodus 21:12–
21:17 and from those following immediately afterwards at Exodus 22:18–
22:20.  The fact that nearly all biblical tort laws are grouped together in 
Exodus 21:18–22:17 can be regarded as a further indication that the biblical 
legislators or editors themselves distinguished such laws from other legal 
categories.   
It is often said that biblical law fails to distinguish between criminal 
and civil law.  The present study, however, finds not only consistent 
distinctions between civil and criminal law; it also finds that both contract 
and tort laws are well-established, separate categories in biblical 
jurisprudence.  Characterizing those biblical laws that functioned in biblical 
times as what we now call contract and tort laws should be helpful both to 
biblical scholars who describe the substance of biblical law, as well as to 
legal scholars who attempt to trace similarities and possible connections 
between biblical and other ancient Near Eastern law, and contemporary 
jurisprudence.  In any event, it is now clear that such biblical laws as those 
considered here are not nearly so arcane and alien to modern thought as has 
been commonly supposed. 
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